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1. INTRODUCTION
Removal of the decay heat for a prolonged period is a
significant reactor safety concern, especially after an accident
like SBO. Failure to remove decay heat may cause the fuel
temperature to rise to unacceptable levels and can cause
core melt accidents like Three Mile Island and Fukushima.
In such a scenario, passive systems play important roles.
The new generation reactors are being designed with this
aspect in mind [1-5]. 
Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) [5] is an
innovative reactor designed for thorium utilization with
special emphasis on the use of passive systems for normal
operation and accidents. It is a vertical-pressure-tube-type
heavy-water-moderated and boiling-light-water-cooled
reactor. AHWR employs natural circulation as the mode
for removing the fission heat from the reactor core during
normal operation as well as during accidental conditions.
Besides, AHWR design incorporates various passive safety
systems which include an Isolation Condenser System (ICS)
for removal of decay heat, a Passive Containment Cooling
System (PCCS) for containment cooling and depressuri-
zation, passive ECCS injection directly into the channels
in case of a LOCA, a Passive Poison Injection System
(PPIS) to shut down the reactor passively in case of non-
availability of the wired shut down system, passive submer-
gence of the core and feeders in a subcooled water pool
in case of a LOCA using the water from GDWP, and a
Passive Containment Isolation System (PCIS) for isolating
the containment from the external atmosphere during a
LOCA. The Passive systems in the AHWR are based on
simpler designs operating without an external source of
energy. This enables them to avoid human intervention
in their operation and hence enhances their reliability.
The recent Fukushima accident has raised strong con-
cern and apprehensions about the safety of reactors in case
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of a prolonged SBO continuing for several days. In view
of this, a detailed study has been performed simulating such
a low probable condition in AHWR. A scenario similar to
Fukushima was postulated for the AHWR and analyses
were performed to evaluate the capability of the reactor to
manage the decay heat by passive means for several days,
assuming operators have walked away. The analyses were
performed using the code RELAP5/MOD3.2. The results
indicate that the reactor, after being shut down safely on
a seismic signal similar to that in Fukushima, can remove
the decay heat by passive means using ICs which dissipate
the heat into the GDWP. The large pool of water in the
GDWP (~ 8000 m3) can absorb the decay heat for more
than 50 days. The steam generated by boil-off of the water
in the GDWP can condense passively on the walls of con-
tainment and on the tubes of the PCCS without exceeding
the containment design pressure even for 16 days. If venting
is carried out beyond this period, the decay heat can be
removed passively for more than 50 days. 
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The most important concept adopted in this reactor is
natural circulation as the desired heat removal mode from
the core under all conditions of operation. Decay heat
removal is also accomplished in a passive manner by
establishing a natural circulation path between the Main
Heat Transport System (MHTS) and the Isolation Condenser
System in case of a SBO as mentioned earlier. Table-1
shows the important design parameters of AHWR. Figure
1a shows the general arrangement of MHTS and ICS of
AHWR whereas 1b shows the AHWR primary containment.
Main Heat Transport System (MHTS): The main heat
transport system consists of a vertical core which houses
452 coolant channels. Subcooled water from the steam
drums enters each of the channels through the inlet header.
Boiling takes place in the channel due to the addition of
fission heat and the two-phase mixture is carried to the
steam drum (4 nos.) through corresponding tailpipes. The
steam drum is a horizontal cylindrical vessel with appro-
priate internals kept at an elevation of 32.5 m with respect
to the axial center of the core, where gravity separation of
the two-phase mixture is achieved. Nearly dry saturated
steam leaves the steam drum through steam lines to feed
the turbines. Recirculation water is mixed with feed water
in the steam drum and it flows to the header through the
downcomers (4 nos. per steam drum). 
Isolation Condensers: The Isolation Condenser System
comprises of a set of immersed condensers located in an
elevated water pool called the Gravity Driven Water Pool
(GDWP), and associated piping and valves. The GDWP
holds a huge inventory (8000 m3) of water kept on the top
of the steam drums of the reactor. The relative elevation
of the GDWP with respect to the core is 50.5m. Table-2
shows the important parameters of isolation condensers. 
A branch connection from the steam line carries the
steam to the tube bundle of the immersed condenser through
a distributor and top header. Steam condensation takes
place in the tube bundle and the condensate returns to the
steam drums through a bottom header and condensate
return line. The condensate return line is provided with a
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Reactor power 
Core configuration 
Coolant 
Number of coolant channels 
Pressure tube ID 
Lattice pitch 
No. of pins in fuel cluster 
Active fuel length 
Total core flow rate 
Coolant inlet temperature 
Feed water temperature 
Average steam quality 
Steam generation rate 
Steam drum pressure 
MHT loop height 
920 MWth, 300 MWe
Vertical, pressure tube type design 
Boiling light water 
452
120 mm 
225 mm (square pitch) 
54 
3.5 m 
2141 kg/s 
259 °C (nominal) 
130 °C 
19.1 % 
408 kg/s 
70 bar 
39 m 
Table 1. Important Design Parameters of AHWR
Number of ICs
Heat Transfer Area/IC
Number of Pipes/IC
Pitch
Header Length
Header Size
Tube Length
Pipe Size
Overall Size
Length
Width
Height
Level of GDWP when ICs
start uncovering
8
27.28 m2
90
100 mm
1.2 m
300 mm NB SCH 80 
(324 mm OD×25.4 mm WT)
1.6 m
50 mm NB SCH 80 
(60.3 mm OD×5.5 mm WT)
4 m
1.2 m
2.2 m
3.0 m 
(GDWP total Level is 6.67m)
Table 2. Important Parameters of Isolation Condenser
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set of active and passive valves in parallel. The opening
of a passive valve is regulated passively depending on
steam drum pressure. This valve opens when the system
pressure exceeds 76.5 bar and becomes fully open at 79.5
bar. This valve is a self-acting single-port spring-loaded
valve with pressure balancing by stainless steel bellows,
working in proportional mode requiring no external energy-
like pneumatic or electric supply for its actuation. The
valve uses the steam drum pressure as the signal and has
the linear characteristic, i.e. valve opening varies from fully
closed to fully open with the variation of steam drum pres-
sure in the specified range. The active valve is pneumatically
operated which is provided in parallel to the passive valve.
This valve opens at 79.5 bar or in case of failure of the
pneumatic supply, which takes roughly 30 minutes after
the occurrence of SBO irrespective of the MHT pressure.
Under normal operation these valves remain closed, thus
isolating the ICS from the MHTS, and steam flows to the
turbine circuit. However, under SBO conditions the steam
and feed systems are isolated from the MHTS. When the
MHTS pressure rises, the passive valve opens in response
to steam drum pressure and the active valve opens 30 min-
utes after the occurrence of the SBO due to the decrease
of compressed air pressure. 
Emergency Core Cooling System: 
This system provides for the injection of water directly
into the reactor core in three stages. In the first stage, in-
jection from the accumulator takes place when the pressure
in the MHTS falls below 50 bar. In the second stage, water
flows from the GDWP under gravity when the MHTS pres-
sure falls below 3 bar, providing core cooling for three days.
In the third stage, water accumulated in the reactor cavity
is pumped back to the GDWP, from which it eventually
enters the core. The first and the second stages of ECCS
are passively actuated and do not depend on any active
component. The important components of the ECCS are
the GDWP and accumulators as shown in Fig-3. 
Fig. 1a. General Arrangement MHTS and IC System of
AHWR
Fig. 1b. General Arrangement V1 and V2 Volume of
Containment
Fig. 2. Schematic of Decay Heat Removal by Isolation
Condenser Fig. 3. Schematic of Emergency Core Cooling System
Containment Cooling System:
The containment cooling system comprises of three
passive components viz. suppression pool, containment
wall having large surface area, and Passive Containment
Coolers (PCCs). The PCCs are located below the GDWP
and are connected to the GDWP as shown in Figure 4.
During a LOCA, condensation of steam and cooling of
hot air are achieved on the cold walls of the containment
and on the PCC tubes by natural convection of GDWP
water which flows through the PCC tubes. This design
feature ensures long term containment cooling after an
accident. 
3. MODELING OF THE SYSTEMS
Various systems of the reactor viz Main Heat Transport
System (MHTS), Isolation Condenser System (ICS), Emer-
gency Core Cooling System (ECCS), Passive Containment
Cooling System (PCCS), and Primary Containment vol-
umes, i.e. V1 and V2, are integrally simulated with the
system code RELAP5 Mod3.2. RELAP5 Mod3.2 has also
been used to simulate natural circulation in integral test
facilities [6]. Initially, steady state is obtained for MHTS
and the containment volumes V1, V2 and ECCS are
initialized as per the initial conditions given in Table-3. 
Fig 5 shows the RELAP5 Nodalisation of the various
systems of the reactor. All the channels in the MHTS are
grouped as a single equivalent channel having the total flow
area and heat transfer area, generating the full power. This
channel is connected to a single equivalent feeder of the
452 feeders of the reactor and a single equivalent tail pipe
of the 452 tail pipes of the reactor. The four steam drums
are combined into an equivalent steam drum. Similarly all
the downcomers are modeled as an equivalent downcomer
which is connected between the header and steam drum.
All the tubes in the ICS are combined into an equivalent
tube connected between the headers of the ICS. Five axial
nodes are taken for IC tubes, which are associated with heat
structure. The GDWP is connected to the containment
volume V2 since the GDWP is situated at the top of the
containment. The two containment volumes are initially
isolated from each other and filled with air at the normal
operating condition as shown in Table-1. The containment
volume V1 is modeled without heat absorbing capacity,
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MHTS
V1 Volume
V2 Volume
Advanced
Accumulator
(ECCS)
GDWP
(ECCS)
Passive Valve
Active Valve
Pressure
70bar
1.0056bar
1.0046172bar
55bar
4 bar
Start opening
at 76.5 bar and
fully opens at
79.5 bar of
MHTS
Opens at 79.5
bar of MHTS
or 30 minutes
after SBO (due
to loss of pneu-
matic supply) 
Temperature
Core Inlet  =  260°C
Core Outlet =  285°C
285°C
30°C
40°C
40°C
Power
920MW
(Full Power)
Table 3. Initial Operating Conditions for Various Systems of
the Reactor
Fig. 5. RELAP5 Nodalization of AHWR 
Fig. 4. Schematic of Passive Containment Coolers
while volume V2 is modeled with heat absorbing capacity.
In order to estimate the heat transfer to the containment wall
during condensation, the heat structure associated with the
containment volume V2 is divided into 21 mesh points. The
first 5 mesh points are 5 mm wide and the next 5 mesh
points are 10 mm wide. This is followed by 5 mesh points
of 25 mm width and 6 mesh points of 322.5mm. Since
concrete has poor thermal conductivity and high heat capac-
ity, the nodalisation considered in the radial direction gives
a more accurate prediction of condensation on the V2 vol-
ume wall than considering an average one, so to account for
the realistic rate of heat transfer relatively fine nodalisation
is taken.
4. EVENT SCENARIO CONSIDERED
A prolonged SBO condition has been considered for
analyzing the decay heat removal capability of the reactor.
The cause of the SBO is postulated to be a strong earthquake
followed by a Tsunami which may cause the SBO. With
initiation of the earthquake, the reactor is safely shut down
on the seismic signal. The turbine is tripped which causes
closure of CIESV and the feed water supply line is also
isolated at the same time due to unavailability of feed pumps.
Thus, the MHTS becomes boxed up, which causes the
pressure of the MHTS to start rising. When the pressure
of the MHTS reaches the set point of the passive valve of
the Isolation Condenser (IC), i.e. 76.5 bar, the ICS gets
valved in. Due to unavailability of the power supply, the
pneumatic pressure is lost after 30 minutes, which causes
the active valve in the ICS to remain continuously open.
If the pressure of the MHTS falls below 50 bar, ECCS
injection from accumulators starts and continues until the
level in the accumulators falls below 75 cms which is a
low level isolation of accumulator. If the MHTS pressure
does fall below 3 bar then injection from GDWP may start
injecting water into the core. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS: 
Figures 6 and 7 show the variation of decay power and
MHTS pressure respectively. At time t=0 s, the reactor
trips on the seismic signal. Due to a rise in pressure, the
passive valves open at 76.5 bar after nearly 600 seconds.
The steam generated in the MHT system is condensed in
the ICS and this causes the pressure in the MHT to remain
more or less constant. Figure 8 shows the steam flow rate
from the MHT to the ICS. The flow rate is initially higher
due to larger decay heat, which reduces continuously due
to reduction of decay heat with time. The active valve opens
after 30 minutes, which helps a larger flow rate of steam
into the ICS. This causes rapid condensation of steam
resulting in progressive decrease of MHT pressure. At
around 45 minutes, the MHT pressure falls to the set point
of the accumulators and cold water is injected into the core
passively. At about 2.5 hrs., accumulator injection stops
due to the low level of accumulators (Figure 9). The MHT
pressure remains well above the inject set point of GDWP.
As a result no injection from GDWP occurs during the
whole transient. 
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Fig. 6. Decay Heat Curve for AHWR (Log-Log Plot)
Fig. 7. Variation of MHTS Pressure
Fig. 8. Steam Flow Rate from MHT to ICS
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The rise in water temperature in GDWP is shown in
Figure 10. It can be seen from Figure 10 that there is an
initial surge in GDWP water temperature, which is due to
the high decay heat just after reactor shutdown. It reaches
the saturation temperature at atmospheric pressure after
nearly 8 days. After this period, boiling occurs in the GDWP
causing the pressure to rise in containment (Figure 11). Due
to the rise in containment pressure, the GDWP saturation
temperature also increases as seen in Figure 10 since it is
exposed to the V2 volume directly. The containment pres-
sure rises to nearly 1.3 bar after more than 10 days of the
accident, which is far below the design pressure of the
containment. The volumetric inventory of water in the
GDWP is shown in Figure 12. It is observed that there is
still more than 7500 m3 of water in the GDWP even after
10 days of the accident. 
The variation of clad surface temperature is shown in
Figure 13. The clad surface temperature falls below 125
deg C after such a long transient, which implies that the
passive systems are capable of cooling the fuel with suffi-
cient margins for such a prolonged period. 
If containment venting is carried out after 10 days of
the accident, the decay heat is removed by ICS by boil-
off of the GDWP water. Results show that there is still
more than 4500 m3 of water in the GDWP even after 50
days of the accident (Figure 14). The clad surface tempera-
ture also remains well below the operating temperature
during this period (Figure 15).
Analysis has been repeated for the decay heat removal
capability of - AHWR using the ICS assuming the active
valves fail to open, for a 10 day period. In this case, the
connection between the ICS and MHT is established by
Fig. 9. Variation of Accumulator Level
Fig. 10. Variation of GDWP Water Temperature
Fig. 11. Variation of Containment Pressure
Fig. 12. GDWP Water Inventory
Fig. 13. Variation of Clad Surface Temperature
passive valve only, which opens at 76.5 bar. Unlike the
active valve, this valve closes if the MHT pressure falls
below the above pressure. As a result of which, the MHT
pressure is found to remain more or less constant during
the transient (Figure 16). Variation of water temperature
in the GDWP is more or less similar to the previous case
(Figure 17), except in the initial period when a larger flow
of steam occurs into the ICS than the former case since
both active and passive valves are open. The clad surface
temperature is well below the safety limit during the whole
transient (Figure 18). The temperature is more or less
constant, but it is higher compared to the previous case
since no ECCS injection occurs in this case. Even after
10 days of the accident, the containment pressure is around
1.0316 bar which is roughly the same as the previous case
as shown in Figure 19. 
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Fig. 14. GDWP Water Inventory 
Fig. 15. Clad Surface Temperature
Fig. 16. Variation of MHT Pressure with and without Active
Valves 
Fig. 17. Variation of GDWP Water Temperature with and
without Active Valves 
Fig. 18. Variation of Clad Surface Temperature with and
without Active Valves
Fig. 19. Variation of Containment Pressure with and without
Active Valves for 10 days 
6. CONCLUSIONS
Considering the concerns of nuclear reactor safety after
the recent Fukushima accidents, a safety analysis has been
performed for AHWR for a prolonged SBO condition of
several days without invoking any operator actions. Results
indicate that the Isolation Condensers are capable of remov-
ing the decay heat of the reactor by passive means with
sufficient safety margins. The clad surface temperature
was found to remain well within the safety limits during
the whole transient. The large pool of water in the
GDWP plays an important role in such a situation, since
it is able to absorb the decay heat from the Isolation
Condensers for more than 50 days. The containment
pressure hardly reaches to 1.3 bar even after 10 days of
accident. If venting is carried out after this period, the
reactor can safely diffuse the decay heat by passive
means for more than 50 days without any concerns with
regard to fuel temperatures. 
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